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Insensate Oysters and
Our Nonconsensual Existence
Karl Steel
But the life of a man is of no greater importance to
the universe than that of an oyster
—David Hume, “On Suicide”

What is prematurely, or belatedly, called the ‘I’ is,
at the outset, enthralled.
—Judith Butler, Precarious Life1

T

he earliest version of this paper, delivered

at the Oceanic New York symposium, tried to change
the way people normally write about oysters. Oyster
books love to talk about pearls and Chesapeake Bay’s oyster
war; they love how oyster middens chart the passage not
of cavemen but of “covemen,” who followed the beds of
oysters around coasts in a kind of gustatory cartography.2
These same writers happily accept the oyster’s fleshy invitation to aphrodisiacal excess. And when they look to New
1

David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Posthumous
Essays, Of the Immortality of the Soul, and Of Suicide, from An
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding of Miracles, ed. Richard H.
Popkin. 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1998), 100; Judith Butler,
Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso,
2004), 45.

2

For a superior discussion of human development and the waters,
see John R. Gillis, The Human Shore: Seacoasts in History (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2012).
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York City, they love to mourn the loss of its oyster beds,
closed by pollution and over-harvesting, perhaps for good,
in 1927, once home to trillions of the creatures, a seedbed for nostalgia for the grittier appetites of New York’s
presumably populist past.3 I asked us to remember the
oyster itself by remembering its shell, calcium carbonate,
particularly important now to offset the increasing acidification of the oceans; likewise, I asked that we appreciate
how prodigiously a living oyster filters water. What they
ingest and don’t eat, oysters eject as pseudofeces, which,
coated in mucous, fall to the ocean floor to be processed by
anoxic bacteria. The cleaner, deacidified water oysters leave
behind is what just about everything else needs to live. I
wanted us to look to projects to use bring oysters back to
New York, like the architect Kate Orff ’s call for “oystertecture,” an “invertebrate architecture” to help abate the force
of hurricanes, to keep New York City safe from our future’s
inevitable Sandies.4
3

For a sampling of oyster books, see Mark Kurlansky, The Big Oyster:
History on the Half Shell (New York: Ballantine Books, 2006); Rebecca
Stott, Oyster (London: Reaktion, 2004); Drew Smith, Oyster: A World
History (Stroud: History Press, 2010); Robb Walsh, Sex, Death &
Oysters: A Half-Shell Lover’s World Tour (Berkeley: Counterpoint,
2009); John R. Wennersten, The Oyster Wars of Chesapeake Bay
(Centreville, MD: Tidewater Publishers, 1981). The libretto of an
1880 comic opera on the Chesapeake Bay Oyster Wars (“Driven
from the Seas: or, The Pirate Dredger’s Doom”) is available online
at https://digitalarchive.wm.edu/handle/10288/17235

4

For oyster facts, see the following New York Times articles: Andrew
C. Revkin, “Students Press the Case for Oysters as New York’s Surge
Protector,” Nov 12, 2012, sec. Opinion; Alan Feuer, “Protecting the
City, Before Next Time,” Nov 3, 2013, sec. NY/Region; and Douglas
Quenqua, “Oyster Shells Are an Antacid to the Oceans,” May 20,
2013, sec. Science. See also Kate Orff ’s “Oyster-Tecture” exhibit at
MoMA’s ‘Rising Currents’ 2010 Exhibition, http://www.scapestudio.
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And that’s all of course still important, but that
approach still thinks of the oyster primarily there to be
used, not as food this time, but as the ocean’s purifier
and our salvation. The oyster in itself still remains on the
outside of our care, distinct from us, exiled to where even
Peter Singer left them, with the plants and the rocks, when
he notoriously declared that the line between ethically significant and ethically insignificant animals lies “somewhere
between a shrimp and an oyster.” When Singer himself says
that there’s “no good reason for avoiding eating sustainably
produced oysters,” because oysters are no more likely
to feel pain than plants do, it seems that no one could
possibly remain to care about the oyster as such.5 This
helplessness, this absolute passivity of the oyster’s flesh, will
be the object subject of this essay. I see the oyster’s passivity
and exposure to being injured as not as alien to our human
condition, but—maybe predictably—as emblematic of
it, countering both the certainty that the chief feature of
humans is our agency and that oysters, being just objects,
are completely outside the possibilities of justice.
This carelessness about oysters is a rare instance where
the thoughts of Peter Singer and his arch-nemesis overlap.
Descartes’ November 1646 letter to Margaret Cavendish,
Duchess of Newcastle, argues that if one believed that
animals had thought, like us, and therefore an immortal
soul, then one would have to believe this of all animals,
com/projects/oyster-tecture/. I thank Alison Kinney for the phrase
“invertebrate architecture.”
5

For Singer’s oyster opinions, see Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A
New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review,
1975), 188; and Christopher Cox, “Consider the Oyster,” Slate Magazine,
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/food/2010/04/consider_the_oyster.
html (accessed May 22, 2014).
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oysters or sponges included, which are “too imperfect for
this to credible [nimis imperfecta sunt, quam ut hoc de iis
judicari queat].”6 In other words, says Descartes, because
oysters are so evidently irrational, animals of whatever type
are basically mechanical in their actions, like clocks. The
monstrous implications and results of this conclusion are
all too easy to trace. While Descartes’ lesson would obviously outrage Singer, both still finally write off the oyster.
For both, the oyster, so helpless and so silent, is the point
where we get to stop caring.
Our effort to save animals from Cartesianism and
even Singerism might begin by giving oysters a voice. Two
examples of this rare literary trick follow, one from the
tenth century, the other from the fifteenth; readers are
invited to continue this work into their own favored oyster
literature, perhaps starting with the silent, misunderstood,
and helpless victims in Lewis Carroll’s “The Walrus and
the Carpenter.” The first of my examples, an Anglo-Saxon
riddle, imagines an oyster, “unable to move” (literally,
“feþelease,” footless), whose first-person complaint helplessly anticipates the bestial voraciousness of some man
who will tear it open “to devour [freten] my flesh” raw.
Then, in the 1540s, we find another talking oyster, in
Giovanni Gelli’s adaptation and expansion of Plutarch’s
Gryllus.7 Plutarch features Ulysses’s philosophical argument
6

“To the Marquess of Newcastle,” The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes, Vol. III: The Correspondence, trans. Robert Stoothoff (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 304; for the Latin original in
a version easily accessed online, see Renati Descartes, Epistolae, Pars
Prima (Amsterdam: Blaviana, 1682), 109.

7

For the riddle, I use the edition and translation, with some
modifications, from Mercedes Salvador, “The Oyster and the Crab:
A Riddle Duo (nos. 77 and 78) in the Exeter Book,” Modern Philology
101.3 (2004): 400–419; for Gelli, I use Giovanni Battista Gelli, Circe:
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with one of his men, since transformed by the sorceress
Circe into a pig (Gryllus means “Grunter”), in which they
debate the respective advantages of humanity and porcinity.
The pig wins. Gelli outdoes Plutarch by letting Ulysses be
out-argued by a series of increasingly complex animals
until he, at last, convinces a philosophical elephant, and
only the elephant, to let itself become human again. The
first, and lowest, animal is, of course, an oyster, a former
fishmonger, which argues that nature evidently loves
oysters best, since, by outfitting them with their own home
and clothes, she frees them from having to work.
Both the riddle and the philosophical dialogue grant
oysters a voice through what Jane Bennett called the “touch
of anthropomorphism.”8 However, while Bennett concentrates on the usually unconsidered agency of garbage heaps,
earthworms, or power grids, these two oyster works speak
not of agency but rather of what the oysters cannot avoid.
As in “The Walrus and the Carpenter,” the voice of the
oyster is mainly a voice of vulnerability. These unmuted
oysters say that they, like us, want to live. They want not
to be injured. The oyster of the Anglo-Saxon talks about
nothing but its utter helplessness, while Gelli’s oyster agrees
to speak only if “those confounded crabs shall not throw a
stone between my two shells...[to] make a meal of me.”9
Consisting of Ten Dialogues between Ulysses and Several Men
Transformed into Beasts, Satirically Representing the Various Passions
of Mankind and the Many Infelicities of Human Life, trans. Thomas
Brown, ed. Robert Martin Adams (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1963).
8

Jane Bennett. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2010), 99.

9

Gelli, Circe 12.
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We ought to seek out fictional experiments like these.
It’s good for our imagination and maybe good for our
ethics and maybe even good for oysters. When we read
or teach texts like these, we advance the new materialist
discovery of agency in places where most people would
never expect to find it. It may be exciting, even chilling, to
suspend our disbelief to work out how even the most inert
of animals might themselves resist, fight back, or make
something new. Or call out to us. But the danger of doing
this through texts like the riddle and the Gelli is that of
thinking the main way to make an oyster, for example,
ethically relevant is to throw our voices into it. Another
danger may be exactly that “touch of anthropomorphism”
in the new materialisms, which is normally a discovery
that nonhuman things can, like us, act agentially. This
presumes too much about what it means to be subjected
to this human condition. As I will argue below, most of
our existence is nonconsensual. Therefore, I am proposing
that a more thorough posthumanism might work harder
to move in the other direction, by concentrating not on
agency but on helplessness. I plead guilty to the charge that
new materialism posthumanism mystifies the relationship
of humans and objects; but it’s not that I want to make the
table dance, but that I want to concentrate on the obtuseness of objects, humans and otherwise, because “agency” is
only one, small way in which we all get to engage with our
environment.
I will do this by taking advantage of oysters’ most
salient characteristic, which is not their voice, not their
anxiety, nor their sensitivity, but rather the absence of
any of this. As even Peter Singer reminds us, oysters are
some of the most insensitive and helpless of animals. For
the speaking oysters of the riddle and the dialogue, what
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is most notable is not their (temporary) rationality but
rather their particular helplessness, their ineluctable
condition of injurability, which, more than any animal,
exemplifies what Derrida called the “nonpower at the heart
of power.”10 What may be needed, then, is not a “touch of
anthropomorphism” to bring oysters over to us but rather a
“touch of oystermorphism” to recognize how much of our
existence we share with theirs. If we think with oysters, or
even as oysters, we might recognize how much of our life is
helpless, and how small a part rationality and agency play
even in our lives. This essay will finally argue that we are
more like oysters than not.
We will therefore leave behind the speaking oysters
of the Exeter Riddles and Gelli to get more deeply into the
ancient oyster tradition in which Descartes was writing.
At least since Pliny, oysters were thought primarily as the
animal without motion, without family, and with virtually
no capacity to react. In the later fourteenth century, John
Trevisa explains that:
The parts of the great world are so ordered and set
that the highest point of the lower creature touches
the lowest point of the next creature, as oysters and
shellfish, which are the lowest in animal kind, surpassing but little the highest form of life of trees and
plants, for oysters cannot move except in the way that
kelp of the sea wags with the water, as otherwise they

10 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, trans. David
Wills, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet (New York: Fordham University Press,
2008), 28.
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cling to the earth and cannot see nor hear nor taste
nor smell; but they feel only when they are touched.11
Philippe de Thaon’s Bestiare (after 1121) believes that oysters
are a kind of stone, which open to receive Heaven’s dew “as
if they were living creatures,” which, having received the
dew, “become again without shapes” [puis se revugnent
senz faitures].”12
Like rocks or plants, they were insensitive to pain,
with only the barest glimmer of life. This semi-lifelessness
meant they were fair game for Christians, even during
fast days. Fish were allowed, primarily because their flesh,
being so unlike ours, was unlikely to stir up our strength
and our pleasure, and because fish were creatures that are,
per Aquinas, “merely bodies having in them something
of a soul” as compared to “land animals,” which are
“living souls with bodies subject to them.”13 At least for
those medievals who knew their natural history, oysters
were anything but an aphrodisiac; being only barely
alive, oysters were perfectly suited—according to one
11

John Trevisa, trans. Polychronicon, ed. Churchill Babington, Vol. II
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1869), 181, “Also as it is in þe
parties of þe grete world þat þey beeþ so i-ordeyned and i-sette þat þe
ouermese of þe neþer kynde touche þe neþermeste of þe ouer kynde,
as oistres and schelle fishe, þat beeþ as it were lowest in bestene kynde,
passeþ but litel þe perfeccioun of lyf of treen and of herbes, for þey
mowe not meue hem but as culpes of þe see waggeþ wiþ þe water,
elles þey cleueþ to þe erthe and mowe noþer see ne hire, ne naste, ne
smelle, but onliche fele when þey beeþ i-touched.”

12 In Thomas Wright, ed. and trans. Popular Treatises on Science Written
During the Middle Ages (London: Y. R. and J. E. Taylor, 1841), 127.
13 For the Aquinas, see his Summa Theologica I.72, “On the Work of the
Sixth Day,” and II.II.147, Art. 8, “The meats from which it is necessary
to abstain.”
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fifteenth-century civic record—to signify the “sadnesse and
abstinence of merth [that] shulde followe...an holy tyme.”14
In all these writers, oysters function mainly to occupy
or delineate the space between inside and outside, in this
case, between life and nonlife, animal and plant, and pain
and a kind of mostly invulnerable life. Or they function to
imagine the helpless materiality of fleshly life, animal life
at its most stonelike. They do this in two ways: the first, as
materializing life in its foundational quality, where on the
scale of existence stones come to life, so here, then, is the
bare basis for material animal life; and second, oysters
materialize life in its insensible, material exposure to harm,
to need, and to simply needing to be here or anywhere at all.
The oyster’s animal existence could not register
more faintly on our attention, just as our own basic
fleshy existence does not tend to register on ours, until,
of course, something goes wrong. For all that, the oyster
exists, plant- and rocklike as it is. And as such, the oyster
is vulnerable. This inescapable condition is what ties us to
oysters most strongly, for whatever the considerable uses of
reason and speech, neither can eliminate our fundamental
vulnerability.
We’re now in a position to reconsider Descartes’
letter to Cavendish. This short letter only slowly gets to
its conclusive denial of thought and soul to nonhuman
animals, and this it does only by retreating to faith:
Descartes just insists that it would be absurd to believe
that oysters, and so on, would have immortal souls. This
14 The quotation is from one account of the Lenten costume John
Gladman supposedly wore for his January 25, 1443, revolt in Norwich;
cited from Chris Humphrey, The Politics of Carnival: Festive Misrule
in Medieval England (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press,
2001), 66.
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is itself a kind of mechanical reflex, a rare instance where
Descartes’ free thought snaps neatly into place because of
instinct. The irony starts earlier though, as much of the
letter is instead about the automatism of most human life.
It explains that somnambulant humans sometimes swim
across rivers they could never cross while awake; for the
most part, we need not think in order to be able to eat or
walk; and if tried not to cover our face as we fell, we would
fail. Our fellow humans may themselves be driven only
mechanically, even in their most apparently thoughtful
moments. All Descartes can say confidently is that, unlike
animals, we ourselves can communicate things not relating
to our passions, but, at least in this letter, he provides no
sustained proof that the communication even of other
humans is anything but mechanical repetition. That is,
only irrational custom or an equally irrational sympathetic
guesswork protects Descartes’ human fellows from being
eaten, used, and vivisected. This guesswork overlays a more
fundamental animal condition that is, for the most part,
unconscious. Like other animals, we have our passions; like
other animals, our passions have us, and our expressions—
of hunger, of self-protection, of motion—are the voice not
of our freedom but of our vulnerable bodily existence. To
use Descartes’ image, we may not be clocks, not entirely,
but we are mostly clocks.
For even Descartes begins by admitting that the
dominant condition of being human is unwilled exposure.
Our existence is at its root not chosen, not rational, not
elective, but rather, primarily, nonconsensual. We flatter
ourselves by thinking that our freedom of choice is our
defining characteristic, but we might ask, with Derrida,
“whether what calls itself human has the right rigorously
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to attribute to man...what he refuses the animal.”15 We do
not chose to be born. We do not chose the conditions of
our being here any more than an oyster does. Our much
vaunted ability to willingly move, which we hold out over
the oysters, still doesn’t untether us from having to live
somewhere. The same goes for our ability to seek out our
food rather than just receive it as the water gives it, like an
oyster, because we still must eat. Whatever the powers of
our agency to supplement our fundamental inadequacy by
building ourselves homes, by wrapping ourselves in clothes
and armor, we can never eliminate our vulnerability. We
cover ourselves for the same reasons, and with the same
necessity, that oysters do.
We can now reconsider and even reverse the standard hierarchy of being that holds humans superior to
plants and plants superior to rocks. The tradition is neatly
expressed by the fifteenth-century Middle English Mirror
of St Edmund:
You may see God’s wisdom if you attend to what kind
of being God to each creature. Some he has given to
be only, without anything more, like stones. To others,
to be and to velive, like grass and trees. To others, to
be, to live, and to feel, like beasts. To others, to be,
to live, to feel, and to judge rationally, like men and
angels.16
15 Derrida, Animal that Therefore, 135.
16 In Religious Pieces in Prose and Verse, ed. G. G. Perry. 1867. EETS
o.s. 26. 2nd ed. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1913), 22, “His
wysdom may þou see if þou take kepe how he [God] hase gyffen to
ylke a creature to be. Some he hase gyffen to be anely, with-owtten
mare, als vn-to stanes. Till oþer to be & to lyffe, als to grysse and trees.
Till oþer to be, to lyffe, to fele, als to bestes. Till oþer to be, to lyffe, to
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Usually, in Descartes for example, the last, rational kind of
being is thought to be the most important. With reason,
or so the story goes, we can do nearly anything. Through
it, we can separate ourselves from our immediate circumstances and from every other living thing and then finally,
at least in mainstream medieval Christianity, we might live
forever through our immortal rational soul rejoined with
a perfected body, so escaping vulnerability altogether. But
among created things, only angels escape being tethered to
the previous kinds of being. For everything else, every kind
of being is additive, supplementing rather than replacing
the previous ones. We could therefore read this hierarchy
of being as one in which the final rational addition is a
veneer over an existence that is mostly animal-like, plantlike, or stonelike. Like angels, humans can reason, but they
also have the same capacities—and accompanying vulnerabilities and needs—as beasts, plants, and rocks.
In this time of climate change, a time, perhaps
more than any other, in which the greatest forces are not
bounded individuals but rather hyperobjects, far beyond
our understanding, we should remember ourselves as
being as helplessly and perhaps as ignorantly enthralled
to the dangers as any oyster.17 As Judith Butler observes
in Precarious Life and Frames of War, most of us are
fele, and with resone to deme, als to mane and to angells. For stanes
erre, bot þay ne hafe nogte lyffe, ne felys noghte, ne demes noghte.
Trees are; þay lyffe, bot thay fele noghte. Men are; þay lyffe, þay fele,
and þay deme, and þay erre with stanes, [þay] lyffe with trees, þay fele
with bestes, and demys with angels.”
17 See Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after
the End of the World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2013); see also Steve Mentz’s post-equilibrium ecology, expressed, for
example, in “Strange weather in King Lear.” Shakespeare 6.2 (2010):
139–152.
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compelled to be more exposed than others, most of us
unheard, and most made more helpless than others; some
of us like to pretend we are exempt, but ultimately, we
are all vulnerable. All of us are more or less wittingly in a
risk society, and even if we assemble the kinds of amateur
scientific knowledge Stacy Alaimo traces in her Bodily
Natures to learn just what in this environment is poisoning
us, we still might find ourselves only more aware of our
helpless enthrallment, without having solved the problem
of just having to be here.18 All we might come to know is
what the oyster of the Anglo-Saxon Riddle already knows,
that something, completely insensitive to us, is coming to
devour us and to move on, without knowing.

18 Stacy Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material
Self (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

